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The Welfare Consequences of Tariff





The domestic energy markets in the United Kingdom are still in a process of
structural change. Earlier this year, limited competition for the supply of
household domestic gas was introduced, with full-scale competition expected to
develop in the next few years. Competition for the supply of electricity to
households is expected to begin in 1998.
The introduction of competition in the supply of these energy goods will
force tariffs to become more cost-reflective. Until now, maintaining cross-
subsidies between consumer groups has not posed any difficulties, given that the
suppliers of electricity as well as British Gas have enjoyed monopoly
concessions. Profits lost by subsidising one group of consumers have been
compensated by higher price-over-cost margins for other groups. Competition is
likely to change this. New entrants will try to target market segments where
current prices are above supply costs and will have no incentive to supply groups
where costs are above prices. To survive, incumbents — who have universal
services obligations — will be forced to end internal cross-subsidies.
There is a presumption that one of the most important cross-subsidies present
in the current pricing structure for energy goods is the balance between the
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standing charge (which is independent of the amount of energy consumed) and
the unit price of energy.
2 The fixed costs of supplying a household, in terms of
metering and billing expenses, are above the standing charge. On the other hand,
the price for each unit of energy is above the supply costs. As competition takes
hold in these markets, we would expect a rebalancing to occur between the two
components of energy prices. The standing charge will probably rise relative to
the unit energy price.
The rebalancing of the fixed and variable charges might be justified on
efficiency grounds — or at least might be unavoidable in a competitive market
— but the distributional consequences could be a cause for concern.
3 Energy
goods are necessities and as such they represent a higher proportion of the
expenditure of low-income households. Price increases for these goods have the
same distributional effects as regressive taxation. Furthermore, since low-income
households also purchase lower amounts of energy, the standing charge
represents a higher proportion of their total energy bill. Thus tariff rebalancing is
more likely to have a negative impact on lower-income households. The savings
due to the lower unit price will be applied to a smaller level of energy
consumption and will not compensate for the increase in the standing
charge.This adverse distributional impact may explain why regulators in these
industries are reluctant to allow an increase in the fixed charge. In the case of
gas, there has been a supplementary price cap applied to the fixed-charge
element of gas prices. This is in addition to the well-known RPI-X cap applied to
gas revenues as a whole. Also, it seems that Ofgas has implicitly sanctioned the
preservation of some level of cross-subsidy in gas prices by setting the fixed
charge for TransCo (the gas transporting company) below what British Gas and
competitors expected (Hancock and Waddams Price, 1995).
The relation between energy prices and welfare has been analysed in
Hancock and Waddams Price (1995) and Burns, Crawford and Dilnot (1995).
These studies confirm that poorer households are more vulnerable to changes in
energy prices. Unlike these previous studies, in the present paper we use an
econometric model of household consumption behaviour to examine these
issues. Thus our model allows for behavioural responses to price changes. This
should yield more precise and quantitative welfare results than those in previous
studies.
In particular, published information on the possible magnitude of the cross-
subsidy in current gas tariffs is used to construct several scenarios of price
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changes. We then examine the welfare consequences of each scenario. The
results show that the majority of households would gain from tariff rebalancing,
although there is a significant group that would be made worse off. Furthermore,
the latter group is composed of poorer and more vulnerable households.
However, we show that if competition reduces customer-related costs by
between 20 and 30 per cent, then almost all households stand to gain.
Our results would seem to suggest that the misgivings of consumer groups
and the regulator with respect to tariff rebalancing may be exaggerated if the
rebalancing is accompanied by an increase in efficiency and a decrease in the
overall tariff level. However, if the potential cost savings that may be achieved
in a competitive market are below the 20-30 per cent range mentioned above,
then tariff rebalancing does pose distributional conflicts.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly discusses the
demand model, the data and the estimation results. Section III estimates the
welfare effects and Section IV concludes.
II. HOUSEHOLD ENERGY DEMAND MODEL
1. The QUAIDS Demand Model
In this paper, the demand model estimated by Gómez-Lobo (1996) is used.
Household preferences were represented by the QUAIDS utility function of
Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1996). This utility function is flexible enough to
portray a wide range of consumption patterns and elasticities, and has some other
appealing characteristics which will be discussed below. Before welfare analysis
can be undertaken, the parameters of this utility function must be estimated. This
is done by first deriving the demand equations from the utility function. The
parameters of the demand system (which are directly related to the parameters of
the utility function) can then be estimated from observed expenditure data.
The demand system consists of six goods: electricity, gas, food, clothing,
alcohol and a category for all other non-durable non-housing expenditures. One
of the most appealing characteristics of the QUAIDS model is that the share of
expenditure on a particular good is a quadratic function of the logarithm of real
total expenditure. An informal assessment of the data (see Figure 1) is supportive
of a linear or quadratic relationship between the expenditure shares and the
logarithm of real expenditure.
4 Therefore the demand system we estimate has a
functional form that appears to be consistent with the data.
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FIGURE 1
Expenditure Shares of Gas and Electricity
2. Data
The model was estimated using data from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES)
from 1985 to 1993. The FES is a yearly random survey of about 7,000
households in the UK. It contains detailed information on household
expenditure, income, ownership of durables, demographic characteristics and
other variables. Particularly important for the present study is the information on
electricity and gas supply connections to the household’s dwelling, gas and
electricity expenditure, mode of payment of gas and electricity bills, type of
central heating and the holdings of energy-using durables.
There is also information in the FES on other domestic fuels such as coal and
oil. However, modelling the consumption of these alternative fuels is difficult.
They are usually purchased in large quantities and stocked. In our sample, we
observe a few households with large expenditures that do not reflect their
consumption during the fortnight of the survey. Conversely, some households
that have zero expenditure may be consuming these fuels but were not observed
purchasing any during the survey period. In the case where all households
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overcome (see Meghir and Robin (1992)). However, in our sample, there are
many households that are genuine non-consumers of coal and oil, and there is no
way of distinguishing them from those households that consume but are not
observed purchasing the product. For this reason, other domestic energy goods
besides gas and electricity are ignored. Due to the decreasing importance of
these fuels in the late 1980s, this omission should not significantly bias the
results.
The total sample includes 55,959 observations, of which 12,498 did not have
a gas supply connection.
5 There are several categories of consumers: those
paying standard tariffs, either through an automatic bank debit system or through
a periodic bill, and those who have a prepayment meter installed and pay a
special tariff. Only a small percentage of consumers have prepayment meters.
6
For those consumers paying through a direct debit system, the recorded
expenditure does not necessarily coincide with their actual consumption for that
quarter. This is because the direct debit arrangement is used to smooth
expenditure over the year. The amount debited from the customer’s bank account
each month is an estimate of the average yearly consumption rather than actual
consumption during the period. Fortunately, the FES also records the
information from the last gas and electricity advice. The advice records the true
consumption by the household during the period and differs from the actual
direct debit payment. The advice figures were used as the relevant expenditure
for those households that paid through a direct debit system.
One of the novelties of the database is the use of two-part tariff information
for gas and electricity instead of the aggregate price indices for these goods from
the retail price index (RPI). Actual tariffs, disaggregated by region and by fixed
and variable charge, were obtained from British Gas and the Electricity
Association. For the other four goods, price indices were constructed using
indices from the RPI.
Since the recorded energy expenditures during the interview period of the
FES usually refer to consumption that occurred in the last quarter, prices for
electricity and gas have been lagged three months. There is an issue about the
correct way to deal with the irresolvable problem of differently dated
expenditures. An alternative specification that was tried was to lag the prices for
all goods by one quarter. However, the specification presented in this paper
seemed to give the best results, and was therefore chosen as the preferred
model.
7 The fixed charge for each of the energy goods was subtracted from the
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Northern Ireland were excluded from our sample.
6 Although this last group pays a special tariff, it was included in the standard credit group.
7 There is an issue about the correct way to deal with the irresolvable problem of differently dated expenditures.
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expenditure on these goods. Total expenditure was the sum of these net
expenditures plus the expenditure on the four other non-energy goods.
The other conditioning variables included regional dummies, cohort
dummies, tenure type, number of rooms in the dwelling, ownership of washing
machine, presence of gas or electricity central heating, monthly dummies,
number of adults in the household, number of retired persons in the household,
number of females in the household, number and age of children in the
household, a dummy variable that reflects whether part of the energy
expenditures is paid through the rent, and a trend. We also included a
temperature variable — the quarterly average of mean daily air temperature at
sea level recorded by the Meteorological Office. There are two temperature
series — one for Scotland and the other for England and Wales. Households
were assigned one or the other depending on the region in which they reside.
3. Estimation Results
Before presenting the estimation results, it is important to discuss certain
features of the domestic energy markets that must be addressed in order to obtain
unbiased estimates.
In the sample, 22 per cent of households did not have a connection to the gas
supply grid and therefore relied almost exclusively on electricity. Therefore there
are many gas shares that are zero and this biases the estimation results when the
full sample is used. One approach to overcome this problem is to use only those
observations that have a positive amount of consumption — that is, to estimate
the share equations using as observations only those households that have gas
connections. However, this does not by itself lead to unbiased estimates.
Intuitively, the problem is that, in the subsample of observations with positive
gas shares, there will be an over-representation of households that have a strong
‘taste’ for gas consumption. Households with a strong ‘taste’ for gas will be
more likely to be connected to the gas network. Not accounting for this
selectivity problem will lead to biased parameter estimates.
To solve this problem, the popular two-step Heckman correction technique is
used (Heckman, 1979). We will outline this approach without going into
technical details. In the first step, the gas connection decision is modelled
through a probit equation based on a set of variables that should influence this
decision.
8 With the estimates from the probit equation, a new variable is formed
for each household — the hazard rate, λ  — and this new variable is added to the
share equations as an additional regressor. Then the demand system can be
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8 In many cases, the household does not make a voluntary decision with respect to the connection to the gas
main. For example, a particular household might live in an area without a gas supply grid. Regional dummies
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estimated using only those observations that are connected to the gas supply
network. The hazard rate controls for the fact that preference for gas
consumption will be higher within the subsample of gas-connected households
than in the overall sample.
9
Energy goods, such as electricity or gas, are usually sold using two-part
tariffs.
10 There is a quarterly standing charge, which is independent of the
amount of energy consumed, and a variable price per unit of energy.
Non-linear prices create kinks in a consumer’s budget constraint and may
induce discrete (non-marginal) responses to price changes. For example, in the
two-part tariff case, when the variable price of the good increases, an individual
may prefer to forgo consumption altogether, and thus save the fixed charge,
rather than reduce his consumption marginally. Non-linear pricing creates a
number of econometric problems (see Moffitt (1990)).
Fortunately, in the case of two-part tariffs (which is a special case of non-
linear pricing), the econometric problems are very similar to those raised by the
connection decision discussed above. The presence of a standing charge makes a
consumer ponder whether it is worth purchasing or connecting at all. Therefore
the two-step selectivity correction approach outlined above is sufficient to
correct for biases arising from the two-part tariff structure of energy goods.
11
Care, however, must be taken in defining the shares and the prices to use in the
estimation. The expenditure on goods should exclude the standing charge, and
shares and total expenditure should be defined accordingly. Also, the price of
domestic fuels in the share equations should be the variable price only.
The results for the gas and electricity equations are presented in Table 1.
12,13
Households in most regions of England and Wales have a tendency to
consume more gas than their counterparts in Scotland (the omitted dummy). The
reverse is true for electricity, pointing to the predominance of electricity as an
energy source in Scotland. Household characteristics, especially the type of
central heating, are an important determinant of energy expenditure. In the case
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probit equation that is not included in the share equations. This identifying variable was the ratio of the fixed
charge of gas to the fixed charge of electricity.
10 Some energy tariffs in the UK are more complex than a two-part tariff. However, the majority of consumers
of domestic gas and electricity face two-part tariffs.
11 Although the use of the two-step selectivity correction technique should lead to unbiased estimates, the
complications posed by non-linear prices must still be addressed when using the model to simulate responses to
price changes. This will be discussed further below.
12 To be consistent with consumer demand theory, the estimated demand system must be symmetric — that is,
the cross-price effects between equations must be equal. Symmetry was imposed on initial estimated
parameters using a one-step minimum-distance estimator. This restriction was rejected by the data, as can be
seen from the Amemiya statistic presented in the notes to Table 1. Other specifications were also tried (in one
case, prices for all goods were lagged one quarter) without an improvement in the Amemiya statistic
13 Although the model was estimated for six goods, only the results for the energy good equations are presented
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of electricity, we were able to control for the presence in the household of a
washing machine and a fridge and/or freezer, both of which have the expected
positive effect on electricity expenditure. A dummy variable for those
households that paid services in their rent or communal charge has the expected
sign, since part of their energy expenditure is paid indirectly. The temperature
variable is lagged one quarter and has the expected negative sign.
The hazard rate, λ , was significantly positive in the gas equation. This is
consistent with people connected to the gas network having an above-average
preference for gas consumption; estimates that do not take account of this
phenomenon will give biased results.
The parameters on the price variables merit some discussion. The own-price
coefficients in both equations are positive and, in the case of electricity, not
significantly different from zero (at a 95 per cent significance level). A positive
or zero coefficient is not inconsistent with negative own-price elasticities, since
the dependent variable is the share of the good in total expenditure. For goods
that have inelastic demands, the quantity purchased will decrease with a price
increase while the share in total expenditure none the less rises.
The cross-price terms indicate that electricity and gas are complements, food
is a complement to both energy goods and alcohol is a substitute for both energy
goods. The complementarity between gas and electricity is not at all surprising,
given that we are assuming that the ownership of energy-using durables is fixed.Fiscal Studies
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Most electricity-using appliances (such as lighting, kitchen appliances and
televisions) are used in household activities where one would also expect gas-
using appliances to be used (gas cookers, gas central heating and gas water
heating).
Table 2 presents the average compensated, uncompensated and budget
elasticities for all equations. The compensated elasticities show the response of
consumers under the hypothetical case that they are compensated for the real
income change that a price increase will produce. It is clear that the demands for
both gas and electricity are inelastic with respect to their own price. The budget
elasticities also show that these goods are necessities over the range of
expenditures present in the sample.
III. WELFARE CALCULATIONS
In this section, we apply the model results to estimate the welfare impacts of
tariff rebalancing in the domestic gas market. It is difficult to establish the exact
magnitude of the cross-subsidy. We use the information contained in Burns,
Crawford and Dilnot (1995). Using information from primary sources, they
establish that customer-related costs of British Gas are of the order of £65. The
standing charge is only £37, implying that a significant (76 per cent) increase in
this price would be necessary to reflect costs. On the other hand, the commodity-
related costs are estimated to be close to 39 pence per therm, 12 per cent below
the 43.8 pence per therm charged by British Gas. Assuming these numbers
reflect, approximately, the magnitude of the cross-subsidy, we will analyse the
welfare impact of three scenarios. The first — the baseline scenario — reflects
the information presented above and corresponds to a total rebalancing of tariffs.
The other two scenarios involve a higher and lower decrease in the unit price but
constrain the profits of British Gas to be the same as in the baseline case. The
three cases analysed are the following:
￿
1.  a 76 per cent increase in the standing charge and a 12 per cent decrease in the
unit price;
2.  a 50 per cent increase in the standing charge and an 8 per cent decrease in the
unit price;
3.  a 105 per cent increase in the standing charge and a 16 per cent decrease in
the unit price.
As a welfare measure, we use the compensating variation. It corresponds to
the amount of monetary resources that must be given to a household after a price
change in order for that household to be able to obtain the same utility level that
it enjoyed before the change. Since the parameter estimates from the demand
system are also the parameters of the utility function, we are able to estimate theTariff Rebalancing in the Domestic Gas Market
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compensating variation for each household. We do this for observations in the
final year of the dataset (1993).
The results are presented in Table 3. The majority of households have a
negative compensating variation. This means that income must be taken away
from these households in order for them to have the same level of welfare as
before the price change. In other words, these households are better off after the
tariff rebalancing than before. The negative effects of the rise in the fixed charge
are more than compensated by the savings due to the fall in the variable price.
All scenarios presented above are roughly profit-neutral.
14 Profit neutrality
implies that some consumers must lose from the tariff change, since someone has
to pay for the lower expenditure of the winners. It can be seen from Table 3 that
there is a significant group of households that are hurt by the tariff changes.
The issue of non-marginal responses when households face a non-linear
budget constraint must be addressed at this point. The results of Table 3
overestimate the welfare impacts of those households that have a positive
compensating variation. This is because some of these households might opt to
disconnect from the service instead of bearing the full cost of tariff rebalancing.
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This, however, does not imply that the results of Table 3 are too extreme. It is
true that the compensating variation for those households that decide to
disconnect is overestimated. However, the revenues lost from these households
must be recovered from those that stay in the market. Therefore tariffs would
have to increase further than we have considered so far if the price change is to
be profit-neutral. This would entail additional welfare losses for other
households.
Figure 2 plots the compensating variations (for case 1) against total
expenditure. It is clear from the graph that there is a negative relation between
the compensating variation and the initial expenditure level. Higher-expenditure
households tend to gain from the tariff rebalancing while lower-expenditure
households are disproportionately the ones that suffer. This is not surprising,
since higher expenditure is associated with a higher consumption of gas
(although the share of expenditure on gas decreases with total expenditure). The
rise in the fixed charge affects all households by the same amount, while the
saving due to the decrease in the unit price is greater for households with high
consumption levels.Tariff Rebalancing in the Domestic Gas Market
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To analyse in more detail who the winners and losers are, Table 4 presents
the results for stratified subsamples of the data.
The regressive nature of the price changes — already observed in Figure 2 —
can be seen by observing the impact by quintile. On average, households in the
first quintile (the poorest 20 per cent of the sample) suffer a welfare loss. In
general, households that consume low amounts of gas will suffer from the
rebalancing of tariffs, since the standing charge is a larger fraction of their
overall bill. Therefore households with characteristics that are associated with
higher gas expenditure, such as the presence of children or higher total
expenditure, will have a lower (and usually negative) compensating variation.
The welfare impacts also differ according to the position in the life cycle of
the head of the household. On average, when the head of the household is
middle-aged (between 25 and 65), the compensating variation is lower than is the
case for younger or older heads of households.
The results of Table 3 show that a significant group of households stand to
lose from tariff rebalancing. Furthermore, the poor and old would be one of the
most vulnerable groups affected. These results are not particularly new (see
Burns, Crawford and Dilnot (1995) and Hancock and Waddams Price (1995)).
However, with the results of the present study, some additional questions can be
answered with respect to the welfare impacts of tariff rebalancing.
First, how important are the welfare losses for the households that are
negatively affected in comparison with the welfare gains of the others? Figure 3
shows the distribution of the compensating variations for the price changes ofFiscal Studies
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case 1. The positive compensating variations are small in comparison with the
negative compensating variations. This implies that the winners gain more than
the losers suffer and thus, potentially, the winners could compensate the latter
group and still have a positive net welfare gain. This is just a reflection of the
efficiency of marginal cost pricing.
FIGURE 3
Frequency Distribution of Compensating Variation: Case 1
Another interesting question refers to the combined effect of tariff
rebalancing and general price cuts that competition might produce. There is
evidence that the introduction of competition in the industrial gas market
reduced prices by between 10 and 15 per cent (House of Commons, 1994). Some
independent suppliers have declared that they will be able to substantially reduce
the standing charge for domestic gas customers (House of Commons, 1994) once
they are allowed to supply in a competitive market. In addition, the regional
electricity companies are entering the gas supply market and there may soon be
an integrated domestic energy charging system. This could produce significant
economies in billing and other customer-related costs. Therefore it is not
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supply of gas intensifies. The crucial question is ‘how large would these cost
savings have to be in order to benefit those consumers who lose from the tariff
rebalancing?’.
Table 5 shows the effects of tariff rebalancing (case 1) combined with
alternative price reductions. The first three cases assume that competition will
reduce customer-related costs by 10 per cent, 20 per cent and 30 per cent,
respectively, and that these cost reductions are passed on to consumers in the
form of lower fixed charges. The final case assumes that customer-related costs
are reduced by 20 per cent and commodity-related costs are reduced by 10 per
cent. It is clear that, if competition is able to reduce customer-related costs (from
the current £65) by between 20 and 30 per cent, the vast majority of consumers
would benefit even after tariffs are rebalanced.
One last comment regards the short-run nature of our estimated demands. The
energy demand equations were conditioned on certain durable goods. This
eliminates the modelling and estimation problems posed by energy-consuming
durables in the demand for fuels. But the cost is that the demands, and the
elasticities calculated from them, are only relevant in the short run. In the long
run, households will be able to change their holdings of durables and we have
not considered that possibility here. However, since consumers will adapt theirFiscal Studies
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behaviour in order to avoid negative impacts, any long-run substitution
possibilities in durable ownership for consumers must decrease any negative
impact of tariff rebalancing.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
From the results presented in Section III, we may conclude that the rebalancing
of tariffs between the fixed charge and the variable charge will have important
distributional impacts. Short of avoiding the tariff rebalancing, there are several
alternatives to address the distributional consequences of this change. In the first
place, as argued by Burns, Crawford and Dilnot (1995), the existing welfare
system could be used as a compensating instrument. Some form of energy
subsidy already exists in the present system. Pensioners, for example, receive
benefits that are linked to weather conditions as a way to compensate for higher
energy bills. Programmes such as this could be expanded if negative
distributional effects on some groups are to be avoided by tariff restructuring.
The advantage of these programmes is that they address distributional issues
through the welfare system and thus allow prices to be set by efficiency
considerations only. We have shown that the compensation required by those
who stand to lose from the price changes is small relative to the gains of the
winners.
A second alternative is lifeline rates. Since the rebalancing of tariffs will
negatively affect those households that consume small amounts of the
commodity in question (for which the standing charge is a higher fraction of the
total expenditure), some special tariff could be designed for small consumers.
More importantly, however, if competition increases the efficiency of gas
supply, it is possible that almost all households gain even when tariffs are
rebalanced. Our results show that reducing customer-related costs by 20 to 30
per cent will eliminate most of the negative distributional impacts of tariff
rebalancing.
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